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FOREWORD
For almost a generation, Somalia has been a byword
for state failure, defying the combined efforts of diplomats and soldiers to restore some semblance of order,
to say nothing of a functional national government. In
the absence of an effective sovereign, the country is
a backdrop for multiple humanitarian crises, as well
as the emergence of an epidemic of maritime piracy
that threatened vital sea lanes in the Gulf of Aden and
the western Indian Ocean. Even worse, notwithstanding a military intervention by the army of neighboring
Ethiopia and the subsequent deployment of an African Union force operating with a mandate from the
United Nations Security Council, an al-Qaeda-linked
militant group, al-Shabaab, managed to seize control
of most of central and southern Somalia and confined
the internationally-recognized government and the
peacekeepers protecting it to little more than a few besieged districts in the capital of Mogadishu.
Consequently, in the space of months, the tide was
turned against the insurgents, and a new Somali authority, appointed in late 2012, presents what appears
to be the most promising chance for a permanent government in recent memory. It is not surprising that
many policymakers have sought to tease out lessons
from the apparent success of the “Somali model” that
might be applicable to similar situations, both in Africa and beyond, where weak governments face Islamist
insurgents, including the Sahel, in particular where alQaeda-affiliated fighters and their allies have posed
severe challenges to embattled governments.
In this monograph, however, Dr. J. Peter Pham
adopts a different approach. Beginning with a keen
appreciation for the intricacies of Somali culture and
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history, he argues that the key is to understand political legitimacy among the Somali and then examines
how both al-Shabaab and the different local polities
that have emerged in Somalia have, to varying degrees, acquired it—as well as how successive Somali
regimes have not. He also explores how weakness of,
and divisions among, the insurgents can be better exploited by engaging and empowering alternative centers of legitimacy. What emerges from his analysis is a
rather nuanced picture of the counterinsurgency strategy that, following several frustrating years, finally
achieved its objectives, as well as several provocative
suggestions.
For these reasons, the Strategic Studies Institute
is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution
to not only regional knowledge about the social,
political, and security challenges faced in a geostrategically sensitive part of the African continent,
but also the broader literature on insurgency and
counterinsurgency.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
For more than 2 decades, Somalia has been the
prime example of a collapsed state, thus far resisting
no fewer than 15 attempts to reconstitute a central government, while the 16th such undertaking, the current
internationally-backed but struggling regime of the
“Federal Republic of Somalia,” just barely maintains
a token presence in the capital and along the southeastern littoral—and that due only to the presence of
a more than 17,000-strong African Union peacekeeping force. In fact, for much of the period, insurgents
spearheaded by the Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen
(Movement of Warrior Youth, al-Shabaab), a militant
Islamist movement with al-Qaeda links, dominated
wide swathes of Somali territory and operated more
or less freely in other areas not under their de facto
control. Despite the desultory record, the apparent
speedy collapse of the insurgency since late-2011 has
made it fashionable within some political and military
circles to cite the “Somalia model” as a prescription
for other conflicts in Africa, including the fight in Mali
against al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and
its allies.
In contrast, this monograph argues that the failure
for so long of any of Somalia’s successive governmental entities to prevail over their opponents and bring
an end to conflict has little to do with the lack of outside assistance, especially of the military variety, often
cited by way of explanation and more to do with other
factors on which external actors can have little positive
effect. Specifically, if the regime fighting an insurgency is unable or unwilling to take the steps to achieve
internal political legitimacy, no outside intervention
will be able to help it to “victory.” In examining how
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such has been the case in Somalia, the nature of political legitimacy in Somali society is closely examined,
deriving pointers not only from the success of al-Shabaab and its allies, but also those of relatively stable
new polities that have emerged in various parts of the
former Somali state in mobilizing clan loyalties and
local community sensibilities. Both the implications of
engaging these alternative centers of legitimacy—an
approach the international community only reluctantly and hesitantly came around to embracing—and
the potential to exploit the opportunity presented by
the weakness of and divisions among the extremists
to not only clear a space for humanitarian action, but
also to ensure a modicum of stability and security in
the geopolitically sensitive Horn of Africa, are then
discussed.
Among the lessons thus drawn, which are applicable to other insurgency and conflict situations in
Africa, is that the repeated failure of internationallybacked attempts to reestablish a national government
in Somalia underscores the limitations of top-down,
state-centric processes that are structurally engineered
with a bias in favor of centralization, rather than bottom-up, community-based approaches better adapted
to the local sensibilities.
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STATE COLLAPSE, INSURGENCY,
AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:
LESSONS FROM SOMALIA
J. Peter Pham
Introduction.
It has been 2 decades since the day in late January
1991 when dictator Muhammad Siyad Barre packed
himself inside the last functioning tank belonging
to his once-powerful military and ignominiously
fled Mogadishu. He left behind a capital in ruins.
Caught in the throes of uncontrolled street violence,
Somalia has been the prime example of what Robert
Rotberg has termed a “collapsed state”: a “rare and
extreme version of the failed state” that is “a mere
geographical expression, a black hole into which a
failed polity has fallen,” where:
there is dark energy, but the forces of entropy have
overwhelmed the radiance that hitherto provided
some semblance of order and other vital political
goods to the inhabitants (no longer the citizens) embraced by language or ethnic affinities or borders.1

The country has stubbornly resisted no fewer than
15 attempts to reconstitute a central government,
and the 16th such undertaking, the internationallybacked,2 but struggling regime of the Federal Republic of Somalia (FRS), barely manages to maintain a
token presence in the capital and along parts of the
southeastern littoral—and that much only thanks to
the presence of the more than 17,000 predominantly Ugandan, Burundian, and Kenyan troops that make
up the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).3
1

For a number of years, insurgents spearheaded
by the Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Movement
of Warrior Youth, al-Shabaab), a militant Islamist
movement that was declared a “specially designated
global terrorist” by the U.S. State Department in
2008,4 a “listed terrorist organization” by the Australian government the following year,5 a “proscribed
organization” by the British government in its 2010
Terrorism Act,6 and a “listed terrorist group” by the
Canadian government,7 dominated wide swathes of
Somali territory and operated more or less freely in
other areas not under their de facto control—with the
exception of the Somaliland and Puntland regions,
which will be discussed later. In fact, if the insurgents
suddenly suffered several major reverses beginning
in 2011, the explanation would seem to lie more with
the effects of the drought that struck that year—and
to their contribution to and poor management of the
resulting famine—as well as the splintering within
al-Shabaab ranks, than to any significant battlefield
losses by the group.
Nevertheless, the apparent speedy collapse of the
insurgency has made it fashionable within political
and military circles to cite the “Somalia model” as a
prescription for other conflicts in Africa, including the
fight in Mali against al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and its allies. General Carter F. Ham, thencommander of the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), hailed the performance of African militaries in Somalia as “extraordinary,” noting that “they
really have degraded the capability of al-Shabaab,”
which was “really diminished . . . because of the role
of the Africans.”8 In his valedictory address, retiring
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson celebrated that “one of Africa’s most en-
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during, intractable, and seemingly hopeless conflicts”
has been transformed “into a major success story and
a potential model for the resolution of other conflicts
on the continent.”9 For his part, Michael A. Sheehan,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict, has declared, “You can
see in our strategies, our policies and programs in [Somalia], some of the components of how our strategy
might look in the months and years ahead.”10
In contrast, this monograph argues that the failure
for so long of any of Somalia’s successive governmental entities to prevail over their opponents and bring
an end to conflict has little to do with the lack of
outside assistance, especially of the military variety,
and more to do with other factors on which external
actors can have little positive effect. Specifically, if
the regime fighting an insurgency is unable or unwilling to take the steps to achieve internal political
legitimacy, no outside intervention will be able to
help it to “victory,” as even a cursory review of the
relationship between legitimacy and military force in
civil wars will confirm. In examining how such has
been the case in Somalia, it will also be necessary to
look at the nature of political legitimacy in Somali
society, deriving pointers from not only the Islamist
insurgents of al-Shabaab and their allies, but also the
successes of relatively stable new polities that have
emerged in various parts of the former Somali state
in mobilizing clan loyalties and local community
sensibilities. Both the implications of engaging these
alternative centers of legitimacy—an approach the
international community only reluctantly and hesitantly came around to embracing—and the potential
to exploit the opportunity presented by the weakness of and divisions among the extremists are then
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discussed, thus not only clearing a space for humanitarian action, but also ensuring a modicum of stability and security in the geopolitically sensitive Horn
of Africa. Finally, lessons are drawn that might have
more realistic applicability to other insurgency and
conflict situations in Africa.
Identity and Legitimacy among the Somali.
Somali identity is historically rooted in paternal
descent (tol), which is meticulously memorialized in
genealogies (abtirsiinyo, reckoning of ancestors) and
determines each individual’s exact place in society.
At the apices of this structure are the “clan-families.”
According to the most generally accepted division,
the major “clan-families” among the Somali are the
Darod, Dir, Hawiye, Isaq, Digil, and Rahanweyn. The
first four, historically predominantly nomadic pastoralists, are identified as “noble” (bilis) clans, while
the Digil and Rahanweyn, also known collectively
as “Digil Mirifle,” were traditionally cultivators and
agro-pastoralists and occupy a second tier in Somali
society. The latter also speak a dialect of Somali, afmaymay, which is so distinct from the af-maxaa dialect
of the former that it is “properly a not-mutually-intelligible language.”11 A third tier also exists in this
Somali social hierarchy, consisting of minority clans
whose members, known collectively as Sab, historically carried out occupations such as metalworking
and tanning that rendered them ritually unclean in
the eyes of the nomadic “noble clans.”12 This social
hierarchy likewise has implications for political life.
It is noteworthy, for example, that the vice president
and defense minister (and sometimes prime minister)
in Siyad Barre’s regime, Mohamed Ali Samantar, was
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a Sab of metalworking background (Tumal). This
particular individual who, thanks to a potentially
far-reaching unanimous 2010 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court,13 is currently the defendant in a lawsuit
in the U.S. federal courts brought under the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991 on behalf of victims of
the regime. This undoubtedly was related to the fact
that his origins made it highly unlikely that he could
ever lead a coup against his benefactor.
Because these genealogical groupings have traditionally been too large and too widely dispersed to
act as politically cohesive units—although in modern
times, the advent of instantaneous mass communications has rendered the segmentary solidarity of their
members a significant factor in national politics—the
clan-families are now subdividing into clans and subclans by descent in the male line from an eponymous
ancestor at the head of each clan lineage. Within the
clan, the most clearly defined subsidiary group is an
individual’s “primary lineage,” which also represents
the limits of exogamy, and within which an individual’s primary identification is with what has been described as the “diya-paying group” (from the Arabic
diya, “blood-wealth”). This most basic and stable unit
of Somali social organization consists of kinsmen with
collective responsibility for one another with respect
to exogenous actors. The unity of the group is founded not only on shared ancestry traced to a common
ancestor four to eight generations back, but also on a
formal political contract (heer) between its members. If
a member of a diya-paying group kills or injures someone outside the group, the members of his group are
jointly responsible for that action and will collectively
undertake the task of making reparation. Conversely,
if one of its members is injured or killed, the diya-pay-
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ing group will either collectively seek vengeance or
share in whatever compensation may be forthcoming.
Of course, the nature of the clan system is itself very
nuanced and, while rooted in blood relationships,
is also historically a consequence of nomadic pastoral life, with its need to defend scarce resources, that
results over time in an openness to the formation of
new alliances and, even later, of new identities.14 British anthropologist I. M. Lewis, arguably the foremost
living authority on Somali history and culture, has observed that:
the vital importance of this grouping, in an environment in which the pressure of population on sparse
environmental resources is acute, and where fighting
over access to water and pasture is common, can hardly be overemphasized

since it is:
upon his diya-paying group, and potentially on wider
circles of clansmen within his clan-family, that the
individual ultimately depends for the security of his
person and property.15

The pervasiveness of the clan system distinguished Somalia from the vast majority of postindependence African states, where the principal
problem was the formation of a viable transcendent
nationalism capable of uniting widely divergent ethnic groups who found themselves grouped together
in “states” created by colonialism. The Somali were
different. They consisted of a single ethnic group
with only one major internal division—the divide
that separated the members of the four “noble clans”
and the Digil Mirifle—and “considered themselves
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bound together by a common language, by an essentially nomadic pastoral culture, and by the shared
profession of Islam.”16 Nationalism was already part
of their experience insofar as national culture is
concerned, since they “spoke the same language,
shared the same predominantly nomadic herding
culture, and were all adherents of Sunni Islam with a
strong attachment to the Sufi brotherhood”; all they
lacked was political unity at the level of the culturally defined nation.17 Thus, Somalis formed an ethnic
group or nation but not, traditionally, a single polity. Despite 50 years of state-building, urbanization,
civil war, state collapse, and emigration, the bonds of
kinship remain the most durable feature of Somali social, political, and economic life. While ethnicity is a
category that has applicability vis-à-vis non-Somalis,
within Somali society, clan is the focus of identity,
notwithstanding the fact that the latter, unlike the
former, does not exhibit readily apparent formal
“markers” but relies instead on genealogical criteria,
which, until fairly recently, were orally transmitted.
From Union to Fragmentation:
A Brief History of Modern Somalia.
Modern Somalia itself, which historically had
never been a unified political entity, was born out of a
union between the British Protectorate of Somaliland,
which became the independent state of Somaliland on
June 26, 1960, and the territory then administered
by Italy as a United Nations (UN) trust that had,
before World War II, been an Italian colony (Somalia Italiana). The latter received its independence on
July 1, 1960, and the two states, under the influence
of the sort of African nationalism fashionable during
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the period, entered into a union, even though they
had never developed a common sense of nationhood and had very different colonial experiences,
common language and religion notwithstanding.
Consequently, by the time army commander Siyad
Barre seized power in October 1969:
it had become increasingly clear that Somali parliamentary democracy had become a travesty, an elaborate, rarefied game with little relevance to the daily
challenges facing the population.18

A year after taking over, Siyad Barre proclaimed
the “Somali Democratic Republic” officially a Marxist state and tried to stamp out clan identity as an
anachronistic barrier to progress that ought to be replaced by nationalism and “Scientific Socialism.” The
non-kinship term jaalle (“friend” or “comrade”) was
introduced to replace the traditional term of polite
address ina’adeer (“cousin”). The positions of traditional clan elders were abolished or, at the very
least, subsumed into the bureaucratic structure of
the state. At the height of the campaign, it became a
criminal offense to even refer to one’s own or another’s clan identity.19 Given how deeply rooted the clan
identity was, it was not surprising that Jaalle Siyad
Barre failed in his efforts to efface the bonds. Ironically, he evolved over time from a Soviet client into a
U.S. ally after President Jimmy Carter broke with the
Ethiopian regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam over the
latter’s increasingly repressive human rights record.20
Ultimately, the regime itself simply dissolved in
January 1991, when Siyad Barre was caught between
popular rebellions led by the Isaq and Darod in the
north and a Hawiye uprising in central Somalia and
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chased out of Mogadishu altogether. By the time of
the dictator’s flight, Somalia had fallen apart into the
traditional clan and lineage divisions that, in the absence of other forms of law and order, alone offered
some degree of security. The general situation now
vividly recalled the descriptions of Richard Francis
Burton and other 19th century European explorers: a
land of clan (and clan segment) republics where the
would-be traveler needed to secure the protection of
each group whose territory he sought to traverse.21
Although Siyad Barre had adopted “Scientific Socialism” with the professed goal of uniting the nation by eliminating its ancient clan-based division, the
dictator soon fell back on calling on kinship ties in
order to maintain power—another example of these
bonds’ continuing relevance. With the exception of
his previously mentioned defense chief Samantar,
Siyad Barre’s most trusted ministers came from his
own Darod clan-family: the Marehan clan of his paternal relations; the Dhulbahante clan of his son-in-law
Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle, who headed the notorious National Security Service; and the Ogaden clan of
his maternal kin. Siyad Barre’s “MOD” coalition first
led him into the disastrous Ogaden War (1977–78),
a clumsy attempt to exploit the chaos of the Ethiopian Revolution to seize the eponymous territory
in the Haud plateau that the dictator’s irredentist
kinsfolk viewed as “Western Somalia.” The influx of
over a million Ogadeni refugees following the Somali military’s humiliating defeat at the hands of the
Ethiopians and their Soviet and Cuban allies created enormous problems for the Somali state. These
challenges were only exacerbated when half of the
Ogadeni refugees were placed in refugee camps in
the middle of the northern regions of Somaliland,
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the historical territory of their traditional rivals, the
Isaq. This led to the formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM) by the Isaq. Another result
of the failed war was an abortive coup attempt by
disaffected officers from the Majeerteen clan, another
Darod group; those who escaped arrest went on to
form the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, with the
backing of their clansmen. Over the next decade, the
two new opposition groups, both born of a conflict
that had its origins in Siyad Barre’s own complicated
political management strategy, would light the fuses
that would ultimately explode not just the dictatorship, but the Somali state itself.22
After the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime,
the Hawiye leaders whose forces held sway over
the abandoned capital, Muhammad Farah ‘Aideed
and Ali Mahdi, fell out with one another. The fighting and subsequent cutoff of food supplies brought
about a humanitarian crisis that provoked global
outrage, leading to no fewer than three successive international military interventions that aimed
to secure the flow of humanitarian assistance: the
United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM
I, April–December 1992), the U.S.–led Unified Task
Force (UNITAF, December 1992–May 1993), and the
United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM
II, March 1993–March 1995).23 Ultimately, however,
central and southern Somalia reverted to the age-old
pattern of armed clan factions mobilized by powerful
figures—referred to by Somalis with the traditional
title formerly reserved for battle leaders, abbaanduule,
and thus quickly dubbed “warlords” by foreign journalists. These factions were sustained by the spoils of
conflict, vying with each other for control of territory, and such economic assets as could be found amid
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the ruins of the collapsed state, including bananas for
export.24
Meanwhile, in the absence of effective political
structures of any kind, Islamic authorities arose in
response to increased crime, with shari’a being a
common denominator around which different communities could organize. As the Islamic legal authorities gradually assumed policing and adjudication roles, those authorities who enjoyed access to
greater (that is, external) resources acquired greater
influence. It should be noted that, although the Somali traditionally subscribe to Sunni Islam, they also
follow the Shāfī’s school (madhab) of jurisprudence,
which, although conservative, is open to a variety of
liberal views regarding practice.25 Throughout most
of the historical times up to independence in 1960,
even though different movements existed within
Sunni Islam in Somalia, the most dominant among
the populace were the Sufi brotherhoods (tarīqa,
plural turuq), especially that of the Qadiriyya and
the Ahmadiyya orders, introduced into Somali
lands in the 19th century.26 While traditional Islamic
schools and scholars (ulamā ) played a role as focal
points for rudimentary political opposition to colonial rule in Italian Somalia, their role in the politics
of the Somali clan structure was historically neither
institutionalized nor particularly prominent. In part,
this is because shari’a was not especially entrenched
in Somalia: being largely pastoralist, the Somali relied more on customary law (xeer) than on religious
prescriptions.27 Hence, Somali Islamism is largely
a post-colonial movement that became active in the
late 1980s; in the absence of the state’s collapse and
the ensuing civil strife (and, some authors would add,
somewhat polemically, the renewed U.S. interest in
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potential terrorist linkages in the aftermath of the
September 11, 2011, attacks on the American homeland28), it is doubtful that militant Islamism would be
much more than a marginal force in Somali politics.
Religion’s increased influence has been largely a
phenomenon of small towns and urban centers, although increased adherence to its normative precepts is a wider phenomenon. Islamic religious leaders have helped organize security and other services,
and businessmen in particular have been supportive
of the establishment of shari’a-based courts throughout the south, which were precursors to the Islamic
Courts Union established in Mogadishu in June 2006.
Suffice it to say, the Islamists attempted to fill certain
voids left by state collapse and otherwise unattended
to by emergent forces like the warlords. In doing
so, they also made a bid to supplant clan-based and
other identities, offering a pan-Islamist identity in
lieu of other allegiances.29
Contemporaneously, in the absence of anything
resembling a functioning state and amid the multiplying divisions of a society returning to clan solidarity as the basis for organization, Islam came to be
seen by some Somalis as an alternative to both the
potentially Balkanizing clan-based identities and the
newly emergent criminal syndicates led by so-called
“warlords.”30
The Failure of the Transitional
Federal Government.
Since the collapse of the Somali government and
state in 1991, regional and international actors repeatedly have tried to find ways to reconstitute the
Somali state by sponsoring lengthy peace processes
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aimed at establishing a functioning government
in Mogadishu.31 The embattled Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) was the result of the 14th and 15th
such attempts, the “Nairobi” (or “Mbagathi”) and
“Djibouti” processes.
The Nairobi Process began in October 2002 under the patronage of the sub-regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)32 and with
international support, especially from the European
Union (EU) and the United States. The discussions
were so protracted that it took just over 2 years to
establish the TFG using the “4.5 formula.” According to this framework, power was to be shared between four of the clan-families—Darod, Dir, Hawiye,
and Digil Mirifle (the Isaq, centered in Somaliland,
declined to participate)—with some space (the “0.5”)
granted to minority clans. The Transitional Federal
Charter, agreed to in October 2004, gave the Transitional Federal Institutions of government a 5-year
mandate. Heading up this structure was Darod
warlord Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad, who launched his
national political career with the proceeds of a $1
million ransom he had extracted from the Taiwanese after his militia seized the trawler MV Shen Kno II
in 1997.
Not until June 2005—and then only under heavy
pressure from the Kenyan government, which tired
of footing the bill for guests who had long overstayed
their welcome—did the TFG finally relocate to Somali
territory. Even then, the putative government could
not enter its capital—Prime Minister Mohamed Ali
Ghedi, who, to his credit, at least made the attempt,
narrowly escaped assassination for his trouble—and
settled instead in Jowhar, a provincial town safely
north of Mogadishu, under the protection of a local
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warlord who was a fellow Hawiye clansman and
patron of the prime minister. When relations with
the warlord eventually soured, the TFG was forced
to move on and, in a turn of events that is particularly humiliating in the Somali cultural context, take
shelter among the Rahanweyn in the backwater of
Baidoa, some 250 kilometers southwest of the capital. So undesirable was the location and so reduced
the government’s circumstances that it was February
2006 before the TFG could muster a quorum to convene its parliament in a converted barn.33
Meanwhile, a new force was emerging in Somalia, the Union of Islamic Courts, which was made
up of the militias of the various local tribunals set up
by the Islamists that took control of Mogadishu in
June 2006 after defeating a ragtag coalition of warlords and business leaders hastily thrown together
by the United States (presumably acting through the
Central Intelligence Agency) under the rather ironic
banner of the “Alliance for the Restoration of Peace
and Counter-Terrorism.” The American intervention
achieved the exact opposite of what was intended:
far from being checked, the Islamists actually prevailed and, for the first time since the fall of Siyad
Barre, Mogadishu was united under a single administration. Moreover, the Islamists, who reorganized
themselves into a governmental structure called the
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC), quickly extended
their control over much of southern and central
Somalia, from the southern border of Puntland in
the north to the Kenyan frontier in the south, leaving
the TFG cowering in Baidoa beneath the cover of a
protection force provided by Ethiopia.34
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The CIC was, in many respects, a mixed blessing
for most Somalis. The Islamists cleared away the
roadblocks that had been set up by rival militias
over the years and reopened the port of Mogadishu. They organized some rudimentary services,
including the first municipal garbage collection in
nearly 2 decades. On the other hand, these improvements went hand in hand with the imposition of Islamic strictures that were largely alien to the Somali
experience, including a ban on watching the 2006
FIFA World Cup (deemed “un-Islamic behavior”).35
Given their own earlier experiences with Somali
Islamism, especially al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (the Islamic
Union), a group established in the early 1980s that
sought to create an expansive Islamic Republic of
Greater Somalia and eventually a political union embracing all Muslims in the Horn of Africa,36 it was not
surprising that, after many of the same extremists
assumed positions of authority in the CIC, neighboring Ethiopia would be alarmed by the rapid Islamist rise in Somalia. When a CIC attack on the
TFG in Baidoa, where the remnants of the TFG were
being protected by units from the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), provided the casus belli,
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi launched
a full-scale military intervention on Christmas Eve
2006. The heavily armed and well-trained Ethiopians quickly routed the CIC’s forces, many of whose
commanders made the mistake of deploying units
in open country, where they were slaughtered by the
invaders. “On the coat-tails of the Ethiopian forces
rode the TFG”37 which, with the help of the ENDF
expeditionary force, assumed control over key government buildings in Mogadishu.
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As the populace’s sullen acquiescence to the new
regime turned into resentment of what amounted
to a de facto foreign occupation, an insurgency gathered steam. Seeming impervious to his increasingly
tenuous position, Abdullahi Yusuf was finally forced
to resign as president of the TFG in late 2008, with
his intransigence increasingly viewed by Somalia’s
neighbors as an obstacle to the peace process they
had launched earlier that year by reaching out to the
regime’s supposedly “moderate” opponents, led by
former Islamic Courts leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh
Ahmed. Sharif Ahmed was himself installed as the
new TFG president in January 2009 by an electoral
assembly packed for that purpose, which convened
in Djibouti under the sponsorship of the Nairobibased UN Political Office for Somalia and its head,
the special representative of UN Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon, former Mauritanian politician Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. The mandate of the new regime
was extended until August 201138 and then, as that
date drew near, until August 2012 in a deal between
the TFG president and parliamentary speaker,39 although the legal authority under which they acted
could not be ascertained.
Not surprisingly, given its path to power, the
new iteration of the TFG has basically been “unable to expand its authority beyond Villa Somalia in
Mogadishu, seat of the presidency” and “ had little
relevance.”40 In the summer of 2009, when the insurgents attempted to encircle the TFG in Mogadishu,
a number of analysts were surprised by the effectiveness of the Islamist push through territory controlled by Sharif Ahmed’s own Harti sub-clan of
the Abgaal clan—the reluctance of even his closest
kinsmen to defend him was a strong indicator of
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his near-total lack of legitimacy. The promising alliance in early 2010 between the regime and the new
Sufi movement, Ahlu Sunna wal-Jama’a ([Followers
of] the Traditions and Consensus [of the Prophet Muhammad], or ASWJ), whose militias had opposed the
Islamist insurgents in the central regions of Somalia,
collapsed when Sharif Ahmed reneged on the terms
of the power-sharing agreement. Since then, with little
reference to the TFG, the various clan militia loosely
grouped together under the banner of ASWJ gained
control of significant parts of the central Somali region of Galguduud in late-2010 through early-2011
and made modest but appreciable progress toward
achieving local security and stability.
Meanwhile, the TFG president became as unwilling as his predecessor to engage in the sort of deal
making that would co-opt key stake holders, extend
his regime’s political base, and possibly prepare the
ground for security operations that might break the
continual stalemate.41 A March 2010 report by the
UN Monitoring Group on Somalia was, for a diplomatic document, unusually candid in its assessment
of the regime and was, for all intents and purposes,
a scathing indictment not only of the TFG, but also
of any policy built on it:
The military stalemate is less a reflection of opposition strength than of the weakness of the Transitional Federal Government. Despite infusions of foreign
training and assistance, government security forces
remain ineffective, disorganized and corrupt—a
composite of independent militias loyal to senior
government officials and military officers who profit
from the business of war and resist their integration under a single command. During the course of
the mandate, government forces mounted only one
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notable offensive and immediately fell back from all
the positions they managed to seize. The government owes its survival to the small African Union
peace support operation, AMISOM, rather than to its
own troops. . . .42
The security sector as a whole lacks structure, organization and a functional chain of command—a problem that an international assessment of the security
sector attributes to ‘lack of political commitment by
leaders within the Transitional Federal Government
or because of poor common command and control
procedures.’ . . . To date, the Transitional Federal
Government has never managed to deploy regimental or brigade-sized units on the battlefield.
The consequences of these deficiencies include an
inability of the security forces of the Transitional
Federal Government to take and hold ground, and
very poor public perceptions of their performance
by the Somali public. As a result, they have made
few durable military gains during the course of the
mandate, and the front line has remained, in at least
one location, only 500 meters from the presidency.43

In early 2011, the International Crisis Group also
issued an indictment of the TFG, declaring that members of the regime were “not fit to hold public office
and should be forced to resign, isolated, and sanctioned.”44 The document bemoaned the fact that the
TFG “has squandered the goodwill and support it
received and achieved little of significance in the 2
years it has been in office,” and that “every effort to
make the administration modestly functional has become unstuck.”45 This harsh assessment was echoed
by the judgment in the most recent report of the UN
Monitoring Group, released by the Security Council
in July 2011:
18

The principal impediments to security and stabilization in southern Somalia are the Transitional Federal
Government leadership’s lack of vision or cohesion,
its endemic corruption and its failure to advance
the political process. Arguably even more damaging
is the Government’s active resistance to engagement with or the empowerment of local, de facto
political and military forces elsewhere in the country.
Instead, attempts by the Government’s leadership to
monopolize power and resources have aggravated
frictions within the transitional federal institutions,
obstructed the transitional process and crippled the
war against Al-Shabaab, while diverting attention
and assistance away from positive developments
elsewhere in the country.46

Moreover, international efforts to bolster the regime proved not only ineffective, but also counterproductive. A review of the TFG’s books for the
years 2009 and 2010 revealed that although bilateral
assistance to the regime during this period totaled
$75,600,000, only $2,875,000 could be accounted for.
The regime’s auditors—imposed by representatives
of weary donors, especially the European Commission’s special envoy to Somalia, Belgian diplomat
George-Marc André—determined that the missing
money, which represents more than 96 percent of
direct international aid to the TFG, was simply “stolen” and specifically recommended forensic investigations of the Office of the President, the Office
of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Finance, and
the Ministry of Telecommunications, the most egregious offenders.47 Out of the roughly 9,000 troops
that the three separate military missions headed by
the United States, the EU, and France have trained
and armed for the regime, no more than 1,000 re19

mained in Somalia.48 Efforts to supply this miniscule
force actually increased the threat to regional security, with the UN Monitoring Group citing reports
that between one-third and one-half of armaments
supplied to the regime ended up in the illicit market
and concluding that:
diversion of arms and ammunition from the Transitional Federal Government and its affiliated militias has been another significant source of supply
to arms dealers in Mogadishu, and by extension
to al-Shabaab.49

The investigators even highlighted one case in
which a rocket-propelled grenade launcher and associated munitions, purchased for the regime under a U.S. State Department contract to DynCorp
International, found their way into a stronghold of
al-Shabaab that AMISOM captured in early 2011.50
AMISOM: Peacekeepers with No Peace to Keep.
Since the TFG “failed to generate a visible constituency of clan or business supporters in Mogadishu,” the regime’s very survival depended “wholly
on the presence of AMISOM forces.”51 The question
became whether or not the “peacekeeping” mission
was sustainable as a military operation, much less
viable as a strategy.
To its credit and that of its international partners
like the United States—which indirectly financed
the use of private contractors to train, equip, and,
in some cases, guide the African troops in operations52—the progress made by AMISOM over time
was undeniable. Nonetheless, AMISOM’s capacity
was consistently hampered by its lack of manpower
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and materiel. It took 4 years for the force to reach
its original authorized strength of 8,000 peacekeepers, with almost all the troops coming from Burundi
and Uganda.53 While additional deployments from
those two countries in the first half of 2011 brought
the total AMISOM troop strength to just about 10,000,
there were considerable difficulties in bringing the
numbers up to the new ceiling of 12,000 authorized
by the UN Security Council in December 2010. Even
if the troops had been raised and the international community, acting through the UN, the African
Union (AU), or IGAD, been able to adequately equip
the enlarged force in an expeditious amount of time,
it was hardly realistic to expect that a 12,000-strong
contingent would succeed where the infinitely more
robust and better trained and armed UNITAF and
UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) II forces, with
their 37,000 and 28,000 personnel respectively, failed
just a decade and a half earlier against a far less capable opposition than the current crop of Islamist
insurgents.54
In a successful model of counterinsurgency, the
2006–07 Iraq “surge,” the United States committed
more than 160,000 troops to Iraq, backed by a further
100,000 servicemen and women deployed elsewhere
in the region to provide rear support.55 These numbers translate into one pair of boots on the ground
for every 187 Iraqis. AMISOM, in contrast, was tasked
with doing much the same job with one soldier for
every 500 Somalis—if it limited its ambitions to just
southern and central Somalia. AMISOM’s problem
was, unfortunately, an all-too-familiar one: its political architects gave very little thought to what they
hoped to achieve in Somalia, how they intended
to achieve those aims, and what their exit strategy
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might be. Instead, the result has been nothing more
than a charade, whereby the international community pretended to be doing something while it really
did very little, all the while throwing increasing, but
nonetheless inadequate, numbers of African soldiers into a conflict that they cannot hope to win.56
One of the few factors aside from ideology that unites
the various Shabaab factions among themselves was
opposition to the TFG and its AMISOM protectors.
While instances of the sort of indiscriminate shelling
that characterized the TFG’s response to insurgent
attacks early in the mission have decreased with
training, improved targeting, and the identification
of no-fire zones,57 the mere presence of the AU force
and deeply ingrained Somali resentment of foreign
intervention in the country has enabled al-Shabaab
to rally support from a Somali populace that otherwise has little time for its alien strictures, much less
its ham-fisted management of the famine.
The Islamist Insurgents.
While the 2006 Ethiopian intervention ended
the rule of the Islamic Courts, the latter’s al-Shabaab militia not only survived, but later emerged
as the dominant force opposing the TFG and its international supporters. Al-Shabaab itself was born
earlier under the leadership of one of the CIC’s
more hard-line leaders, Sheikh Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys, who wanted to create a military wing for the
Islamist movement whose members would be not
only well-trained, but also indoctrinated to a panIslamist identity that transcended clan allegiances.
Dahir ‘Aweys entrusted this initiative to one of his
young deputies, Adan Hashi Farah (“Ayro”), who
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had travelled to and been trained in Afghanistan
before the al-Qaeda attacks on the United States
and the subsequent American-led invasion in 2001.
Other prominent leaders of the group had also had
experience in Afghanistan and Kashmir, including Mukhtar Robow Ali (“Abu Mansur”), Ibrahim
Haji Jama (“al-Afghani”), and Ahmed Abdi Godane,
(“Abu Zubair”), who eventually succeeded Ayro as
the group’s nominal leader after the latter was killed
in a U.S. airstrike in May 2008.58
After the Ethiopian invasion destroyed the CIC, alShabaab began to operate as an independent entity.
Over time, the group—insofar as its various units
and factions can be said to share commonalities—
has shifted its emphases from a purely local focus on
driving out foreign forces to an increasingly international agenda that has produced both a twin bombing in Kampala, Uganda, in July 2010, and formal
proclamations of its adhesion to al-Qaeda. Gradually gaining control over much of southern and central Somalia—in January 2009, it even took control of
Baidoa, an objective that eluded its former parent organization, the CIC—al-Shabaab has established local
governments in those areas that administer its harsh
version of shari’a, as well as adjudicating more prosaic
disputes. Since early 2009, al-Shabaab forces have not
only attacked the TFG, but also battled with AMISOM
forces, drawing the peacekeepers deeper into the conflict and causing them to suffer increasing casualties
from terrorist attacks such as the September 17, 2009,
suicide bombing that killed 17 peacekeepers, including deputy force commander Brigadier General
Juvenal Niyoyunguruza of Burundi, and wounded
more than 40 others.59 Al-Shabaab has also enjoyed
some success reaching out to the Somali diaspora
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elsewhere in Africa and in Europe, North Africa, the
Middle East, and Australia. Although the number of
Somali recruits is tiny compared to the estimated
two million Somalis in the diaspora, the relative success of the recruitment program has focused considerable international attention—from both terrorist
networks and law enforcement officials—on al-Shabaab’s capabilities, especially the extremist group’s
reach into diaspora communities. One young recruit,
Shirwa Ahmed, perpetrated what was the first
known suicide attack by an American citizen when,
in October 2008, he detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device in Puntland. Others in the
diaspora have been indicted by U.S. prosecutors for
sending funding to the insurgency.60 Al-Shabaab has
also provided training camps for foreign Islamist
militants, as well as safe haven for some highranking al-Qaeda operatives in East Africa, including Abu Taha al-Sudani and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan,
who were subsequently killed by Ethiopian and U.S.
special operations forces, respectively.61
Regarding al-Shabaab and its place among international terrorist networks, considerable confusion and misinformation about the group exists. Most
analysts did not believe that al-Shabaab was, for most
of its history, a branch of or under the operational
control of al-Qaeda.62 However, most—including the
U.S. State Department’s congressionally mandated
Country Reports on Terrorism—acknowledged that
there are many links between the two organizations.63 Certainly, there was evidence dating back to
at least 2007 of operational links—including transfers of knowledge and equipment—between alShabaab in Somalia and what eventually emerged
as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in
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Yemen. Those same links seem also to be at work
in the case of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, a midlevel al-Shabaab militant captured by U.S. forces
in early 2011 while traveling between Somalia and
Yemen, whose nine-count indictment on terrorism
charges by a grand jury in the U.S. Federal Court of
the Southern District of New York was unsealed in
early July 2011; the evidence obtained from his questioning by the High-Value Interrogation Group is
said to have provided some of the clearest evidence
to date of a deepening relationship between alShabaab and AQAP.64 So while unlike the other major
violent Islamist extremist group in Africa, AQIM, 65
al-Shabaab was never formally admitted as a branch
of al-Qaeda during Osama bin Laden’s lifetime, its
status changed as his successors sought to establish
a name for themselves by carrying out attacks—or,
at the very least, apparently expanding the network—
wherever they could. Thus, in February 2012, al-Shabaab leader Godane released a video announcing the
group’s merger with the remnant of al-Qaeda headed
by al-Zawahiri.66
Generally allied with al-Shabaab—although occasionally also competing with it for control of key
towns and strategic resources like the port of Kismayo—is Hizbul Islam (Islamic Party), formed by ‘Aweys and other exiled former CIC hard-liners after the
“moderates” acceded to the Djibouti Process with the
TFG in 2008. The group’s primary difference from alShabaab is that it does not place as much emphasis
on global jihadist objectives; rather, its two principal
demands are the implementation of a strict version
of shari’a as the law in Somalia and withdrawal of
all foreign troops from the country. Although it lost
control of the strategic central town of Beledweyne to
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al-Shabaab forces in June 2010, Hizbul Islam still
controlled some territory in the southern and central
Somali regions of Bay and Lower Shabelle. Subsequently, during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, the two groups cooperated on a joint offensive
against TFG and AMISOM forces in Mogadishu.
Another insurgent group that has been prominent in Somalia was the Mu’askar Ras Kamboni (Ras
Kamboni Brigades), led by Hassan Abdullah Hersi
(“al-Turki”), a former military commander for the
Islamic Courts. Based in Middle and Lower Jubba
Valley, where it gained control of several strategically located towns that control access to the Kenyan
border, including Jilib Afmadoow and Dhoobley, the
Ras Kamboni Brigades were aligned with Hizbul Islam until the beginning of 2010, when the group announced it was joining forces with al-Shabaab. Subsequently, the two groups proclaimed their adhesion
to “the international jihad of al-Qaeda.”67
Over time, the insurgents’ attacks have progressively increased in both ambition and sophistication.
For example, whereas the September 2009 suicide
bombing of AMISOM headquarters and the December 3, 2009, assault that killed three TFG ministers
and 16 people attending a graduation ceremony at
Mogadishu’s Shamu Hotel, both relied solely on
explosives to inflict damage. 68 The August 24, 2010,
attack on the Muna Hotel, a location just blocks
from Villa Somalia that was frequented by TFG officials, involved al-Shabaab fighters dressed in government uniforms who went through the building,
room by room, killing their victims. They then fought
incoming security forces for some time before finally
detonating their suicide vests.69
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In the aftermath of its losses in the Ramadan offensive of 2010, al-Shabaab reshuffled its leadership,
with Ibrahim Haji Jama, a militant who trained and
fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir before returning
to Somalia, emerging as the nominal leader of the
group. More significantly, al-Shabaab has apparently
formally adopted a decentralized system in which
various leaders assume command in their home areas where they are most likely to garner support
from fellow clansmen: the erstwhile emir Godane
assumed control of operations in Somaliland; Fuad
Mohamed Qalaf (“Shongole”) was put in charge in
Puntland; Abu Mansur assumed command of the
Bay and Bakool regions of southern Somalia; Hassan
Abdullah Hersi (“al-Turki”) continued to hold sway
over the Middle and Lower Jubba Valley, albeit with
greater integration of his Ras Kamboni Brigades into
the al-Shabaab organization; and Ali Mohamed Raghe (“Dheere”) overseeing Mogadishu with the assistance of the Comoros-born al-Qaeda in East Africa
chief Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (until the latter’s
June 2011 murder).70 In this respect, the insurgents
essentially combined and exploited the advantages
of both clan ties and Islamic identities.
The Somalia that Works: “Bottom-Up” versus
“Top-Down.”
The most damning aspect of the utter failure of
the 14 different attempts to rebuild the national-level
institutions of the Somali state before the TFG and
the struggles of the latter to survive the daily assaults of the Islamist insurgency was the presence
of ready examples elsewhere in Somali territory of
what is possible when a “bottom-up” or “building-
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block” strategy is adopted instead of a continual
default to a “top-down” approach in conflict resolution, peace building, or counterinsurgency. These
examples illustrate how a process that is viewed as
legitimate and supported by the populace can also
address the international community’s interests concerning issues ranging from humanitarian concerns
to maritime piracy to transnational terrorism.71
Although they differ significantly in their political
development and the courses they have charted
for themselves, the northern Somali regions of Somaliland and Puntland have both been relatively
successful in avoiding not only embroilment in the
violence that has consumed most of southern and
central Somalia, but also major internal conflict.72
After the collapse of the Somali state, elders representing the various clans in the former British Somaliland Protectorate of Somaliland met in the ravaged city of Burao and agreed to a resolution that
annulled the northern territory’s merger with the
former Italian colony and declared a reversion to the
sovereign status it had enjoyed after its achievement
of independence from Great Britain. Unlike other
parts of Somalia, conflict in the region was averted
when the SNM, the principal opposition group that
had led the resistance against the Siyad Barre dictatorship in the region, and Isaq clan leaders purposely
reached out to representatives of other clans in Somaliland, including the Darod/Harti (Dhulbahante
and Warsangeli sub-clans) and Dir (Gadabuursi and
Ise sub-clans). Chairman of the SNM Abdirahman
Ahmed Ali (“Tuur”) was appointed by consensus at
the Burao conference to be interim president of Somaliland for 2 years. In 1993, the Somaliland clans
sent representatives to Borama for a national guur-
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ti, or council of elders, which elected as president
Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, who had briefly been
prime minister of independent Somaliland in 1960,
as well as the democratically elected prime minister of Somalia between 1967 and the military coup
in 1969. Interestingly, while the apportionment of
seats at the two conferences was conducted along
clan lines in a rough attempt to reflect the demographics of the territory, the actual decisionmaking
was carried out by consensus.73
Egal’s tenure saw the drafting of a permanent constitution, approved by 97 percent of the voters in a
May 2001 referendum, which established an executive
branch of government consisting of a directly elected
president and vice president and appointed ministers; a bicameral legislature consisting of an elected
House of Representatives and an upper chamber of
elders, the guurti; and an independent judiciary. After
Egal’s unexpected death in 2002, his vice president,
Dahir Riyale Kahin, succeeded to the presidency. Kahin, in turn, was elected in his own right in a closely
fought election in April 2003—the margin of victory
for the incumbent was just 80 votes out of nearly half
a million cast, and, amazingly, the dispute was settled
peaceably through the courts. Multiparty elections for
the House of Representatives were held in September
2005, which gave the president’s party just 33 of the 82
seats, with the balance split between two other parties.
Although the report of a 2005 AU fact-finding mission led by then-AU Commission Deputy Chairperson Patrick Mazimhaka concluded that:
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the fact that the union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified and also malfunctioned when
it went into action from 1960 to 1990 makes Somaliland’s search for recognition historically unique and
self-justified in African political history,

and recommended that “the AU should find a special method of dealing with this outstanding case,”74
no country has yet recognized Somaliland’s independence. This apparent snub, while grating to Somalilanders, has not prevented them from building
a vibrant polity with a strong civil society sector.
Left to their own devices, the Somalilanders discovered that the demobilization of former fighters, the
formation of national defense and security services,
and the extraordinary resettlement of over one million
refugees and internally displaced persons fostered
the internal consolidation of their renascent polity,
while the establishment of independent newspapers,
radio stations, and a host of local nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and other civic organizations
reinforced the nation-building exercise. The stable
environment has facilitated substantial investments
by both local and diaspora businessmen, who have
built, among other achievements, a telecommunications infrastructure that is more developed than that
of some of Somaliland’s neighbors.75 Coca-Cola has
even opened a $10 million bottling plant in Hargeisa.76
In this context, one needs to single out the educational sector not only as a bridge between Somalilanders in the diaspora and their kinsmen at home, but
also an important impetus for the reconstruction and
development of the region. The showcase of this link
is Amoud University, the first institution of its kind in
Somaliland, which opened its doors in Borama in 1997.
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The school took its name from an eponymous high
school that was the first institution of its kind under
the British Protectorate and had been the alma mater
for many distinguished Somalilanders. The university
was founded as a modest joint effort by local citizens,
who assumed responsibility for the initiative, and their
relations abroad, especially in the Middle East, who
raised money and sent textbooks and other supplies.
The institution opened with just two academic departments, education and business administration—the
former because of the dire need for teachers in the
country and the latter because of the opportunities it
provided for employment in the private sector and entrepreneurship. Even a noted Somali critic of Somaliland’s quest for independence has praised Amoud for
having “under-scored the preciousness of investing in
collective projects that strengthen common values and
deepen peace” and “given the population confidence
that local resources can be mobilized to address development needs.”77 Subsequently, universities have
been established in Hargeisa (2000), Burco (2004), and
Berbera (2009), although the latter institution has its
origins in an older College of Fisheries and Maritime
Management.
Unfortunately, Somaliland’s political progress
has stalled in recent years as a result of the repeated
postponement of presidential and legislative elections
beginning in 2008. Based on my firsthand observation,
it would appear that while the crisis is home-grown,
outside actors, especially the European Commission
(EC) and the NGO Interpeace, have exacerbated the
situation, however unintentionally. First, the nomination of the National Election Commission (NEC) by
the president and the opposition-controlled parliament took longer than expected. Then the government
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in Hargeisa, the EC, and Interpeace reached an agreement to undertake a new round of voter registration
throughout Somaliland that would result in the issuance of a combination voter and national identification card—an admittedly important symbolic goal
for a nascent state. Complicating the exercise further,
the NEC, with the agreement of Somaliland’s political
parties, decided that the card would carry, in addition to a photograph of the bearer, biometric data. The
whole process only began in October 2008 and was
soon thereafter interrupted by the suicide bombings
carried out by al-Shabaab. When the process resumed,
it was carried out with great enthusiasm and dispatch
by both government and donors, so much so that fingerprint data were not collected from more than half
of those registered, and multiple registrations clearly
took place in a number of localities.
Eventually, an internal compromise worked out
in late September 2009 by all three of the region’s political parties, with encouragement from Ethiopia and
the United Kingdom (UK), postponed the terms of the
president and vice president until 1 month after the
elections—the date of which was not specified—thus
preventing the escalation of the crisis into violence but
still not carrying out the elections. While the election
problem is rooted in Somaliland’s internal politics,
the outside actors have done their local partners no
favors by backing a process that was highly problematic from the outset and then, in the case of Interpeace,
becoming embroiled in the expanded conflict. Fortunately, good sense and some timely mediation by the
traditional clan elders won the day, and the internationally monitored presidential election in June 2010
that resulted in the defeat of incumbent Dahir Riyale
Kahin, the election of Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud
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(“Silanyo”), and a smooth transition between the
two—an unheard-of occurrence in the region—reinforced Somaliland’s case for the international recognition that has thus far eluded it. As one report by a
group of Africanist experts concluded:
Recognition of Somaliland would be a most costeffective means to ensure security in an otherwise
troubled and problematic region. Moreover, at a time
when “ungoverned spaces” have emerged as a major
source of global concern, not least in this region of
the world, it is deeply ironic that the international
community should deny itself the opportunity to extend the reach of global governance in a way that
would be beneficial both to itself, and to the people
of Somaliland. For Africa, Somaliland’s recognition
should not threaten a “Pandora’s box” of secessionist
claims in other states. Instead it offers a means to
positively change the incentives for better governance, not only for Somaliland, but also in southcentral Somalia.78

One of the leading experts on the Somalis has put it
in even starker terms:
For both Somalia and Somaliland, separation is viable
in that there is no economic interdependence between
them, but an enforced union against the will of the majority would become a serious liability, possibly leading to war.79

The Darod territories in the northeastern promontory of Somalia have also demonstrated the success of the building-block model and the wisdom
of working with the Somali’s deeply ingrained clan
identities.80 In 1998, tired of being held back by the
constant violence and overall lack of social and po-
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litical progress in central and southern Somalia, traditional clan elders of the Darod clan-family’s Harti
clan—including its Dhulbahante, Majeerteen, and
Warsangeli sub-groups—met in the town of Garowe
and opted to undertake a regional state formation
process of their own in the northeast, establishing an
autonomous administration for what they dubbed
“Puntland State of Somalia.” After extensive consultations within the Darod/Harti clans and sub-clans,
an interim charter was adopted that provided for a
parliament whose members were chosen on a clan
basis and who, in turn, elected a regional president,
the first being Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, who went
on to become president of the TFG in 2004.81
Following Yusuf Ahmed’s departure for what
was to be his disastrous tenure at the head of the TFG,
Puntland legislators chose General Mohamud Muse
Hersi (“Muse Adde”) as the new head of the regional
administration. After serving one 4-year term of office, Muse Adde lost a reelection bid to Abdirahman
Mohamed Mohamud (“Farole”), who was elected in
January 2009 from a field of over a dozen candidates.
Unlike Somaliland, which has opted to reassert its independence, Puntland’s constitution simultaneously
supports the notion of a federal Somalia and asserts
the region’s right to negotiate the terms of union with
any eventual national government. In late 2009, in a
sign that secessionism nonetheless is gaining some
traction, the regional parliament voted unanimously
to adopt a distinctive flag, coat of arms, and anthem.
The region has, of course, become the center of Somali maritime piracy.82 The towns of Eyl and Garaad
in Puntland, together with Hobyo and Xarardheere in
central Somalia, have emerged as the principal pirate
ports. Analysts believe that senior Puntland officials
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are abetting the piracy networks—the UN Sanctions
Monitoring Group has charged that President Farole
and members of his cabinet have received some of the
proceeds of piracy83—and that the region is moving
in the direction of “becoming the pirate version of a
narco-state.”84 This development should not be surprising given that in 2008—a year in which an estimated $100 million was paid in ransom to the pirates
operating there—the entire budget for the Puntland
State amounted to $11.7 million.85 Nevertheless, one
report by the Council on Foreign Relations suggests
the possibility of a “grand bargain,” in which Puntland reins in its piracy-inclined citizens in return for
political and economic engagement by the international community.
Development agencies should also seek to create
a partnership with Puntland’s legitimate business
community—probably the only social segment currently strong enough to challenge the pirate networks.
The international community could focus on organizing the professional community in Puntland into
a professional association, providing capacity-building support, and engaging the group in discussions
about what can be done to reduce piracy. A program
that explicitly ties development incentives in the
coastal zones to antipiracy efforts could effectively
mobilize a population tiring of pirate promiscuity
and excess.86

The problem, of course, is getting members of the
international community to actually engage a nonstate entity like Puntland and to do so in a consistent
and sustainable manner. In 2002, for example, the
Puntland Intelligence Service was established with
American and Ethiopian assistance, but this organization has focused almost exclusively on counterter35

rorism, while largely ignoring wider human security
concerns. The regular police, however, on those occasions when they have been willing to confront pirates
and other organized criminals, have more often than
not found themselves outgunned.87
In addition to this well-known example, other
less-developed political entities are also emerging
out of processes currently at work elsewhere among
the Somali. In the central regions of Galguduud and
Mudug, for example, the local residents set up several years ago what they have dubbed the “Galmudug
State,” complete with its own website.88 Last year, they
elected a veteran of the old Somali military, Colonel
Mohamed Ahmed Alin, to a 3-year term as the second president of what describes itself as “a secular,
decentralized state.” An analogous process is taking
place in Jubaland, along the frontier with Kenya, apparently with the encouragement of that country’s
government, which wants a buffer zone between its
territory and the areas controlled by al-Shabaab in
southern Somalia. In April 2011, the state announced
that a new autonomous authority, “Azania,” had
been inaugurated by the TFG’s own resigned defense
minister, Mohamed Abdi Mohamed (“Gandhi”), as
its first president.89 Meanwhile, another self-declared
administration, “Himan Iyo Heeb,” originally established in 2008 by Habar Gidir clansmen in central Somalia, north of Mogadishu,90 has apparently become
active again.91 Similar stirrings are occurring among
the Hawiye in the Benadir region around Mogadishu
and among the Digil/Rahanweyn clans farther south.
Whatever their respective shortcomings, by leveraging the legitimacy enjoyed by virtue of deeply rooted kinship and geographic bonds—to say nothing of a
very personal political consent—traditional leaders in
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Somaliland, Puntland, and other Somali regions have
managed to deliver to their constituents a relatively
high degree of peace, security, economic progress,
and rule of law, despite the lack of international recognition or involvement. Put another way, they have
combined Weber’s “traditional legitimacy” and “legal
right” with service provision in order to establish a
sustainable political arrangement, “an order beside
the state.”92 As counterinsurgency theorist David Kilcullen has noted:
Somalia is virtually a laboratory test case, with the
south acting as a control group against the experiment in the north. We have the same ethnic groups,
in some cases the same clans or even the same
people, coming out of the same civil war and the
same famine and humanitarian disaster, resulting
from the collapse of the same state, yet you see completely different results arising from a bottom-up
peace-building process based on local-level rule of
law versus a top-down approach based on putting
in place a “grand bargain” at the elite level.93

Vital to Somaliland, Puntland, and other areas’
relatively successful efforts to avoid both major internal conflict and embroilment in the violence affecting most of southern Somalia has been the role
played by their clans. Traditional clan elders have
negotiated questions of political representation in key
forums. In circumstances under which elections were
impossible, representatives were designated by clan
units from among their members through a deliberative process in which all adult males had an opportunity to participate, and decisions were made on a
consensual basis. In stark contrast to the TFG process,
which emphasizes the individual actor, the resulting
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social contract is created between groups with deeply
rooted legitimacy in kinship and geographic bonds.
Interestingly, another trait that the authorities in
Somaliland and Puntland share with each other but
not with the TFG in Mogadishu is the fact that they
have largely been self-supporting with respect to governmental finances. It has been argued that one of the
most significant factors undermining state formation
in Africa has been a limited revenue base—that is, a
dependence on foreign aid and/or natural resource
extraction for revenue. Throughout the world, the experience has demonstrated that taxation as a means
of raising revenue not only provides income for the
state, but also facilitates a greater cohesion between
the state and its stakeholders. In contrast, the virtual
absence of taxation in post-colonial Africa has resulted
in regimes that are largely decoupled from their societies.94 From this perspective, it is most telling that the
most advanced state-building project among the Somalis has been in Somaliland, where the government
collects taxes and license fees from business and real
estate owners and imposes duties on the trade in khat,
the mildly narcotic evergreen leaf chewed by many
in the region, as well as on imports and exports that
flow through the port of Berbera. The government
of Somaliland has actually adopted a “supply-side”
approach by managing to increase revenue by more
than halving the rates sales and income taxes (from
12 to 5 percent and from as much as 25 to 10 percent,
respectively). Responding to this success, the World
Bank has undertaken to train tax officials and the U.S.
Agency for International Development has agreed to
build 10 inland-revenue centers across the region.95
Furthermore, the funds raised have been spent in a
manner that could hardly be more transparent: the
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introduction last year of universal free primary and
intermediate schooling through the elimination of
school fees. Likewise, what is arguably the second
most successful state-building exercise is occurring in
Puntland, where the reliance on customs duties and
an occasional fisheries license is perhaps more remote
than direct taxes, but nonetheless requires that the
government maintain certain minimum levels of efficiency (yet another reason why revenue flows from
piracy, which is centered in Puntland, are so pernicious). In contrast, the TFG and its predecessors
have relied exclusively on foreign aid—when they
were not stealing it.
Perhaps most important in the context of the rising tide of Islamist militancy in southern and central
Somalia is the fact that, as one of the most astute observers of contemporary Somali society has observed,
this reliance—especially in Somaliland, but also in
Puntland—on the older system of clan elders and the
respect they command “has served as something of
a mediating force in managing pragmatic interaction
between custom and tradition; Islam and the secular
realm of modern nationalism,” leading to a unique
situation where “Islam may be pre-empting and/or
containing Islamism.”96 The consequence of the development of an organic relationship between Somali
culture and tradition and Islam appears to ensure a
stabilizing, rather than disruptive, role for religion in
society in general and religion and politics in particular. In Somaliland, for example, although population
is almost exclusively Sunni Muslim and the shahāda,
the Muslim profession of the oneness of God and the
acceptance of Muhammad as God’s final prophet, is
emblazoned on the flag, shari’a is only one of three
sources of jurisprudence used in the region’s courts,
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alongside secular legislation and Somali traditional
law (xeer). However, given the limited resources of
the Somaliland government, Quranic schools play
an important role in basic education. Yet alongside
these popular institutions stand equally well-received
secular charities like the Hargeisa’s Edna Adan Maternity Hospital, founded in 2002 by Edna Adan Ismail,
the former foreign minister of Somaliland, which
provides a higher standard of care than is available
anywhere else in the Somali lands for maternity and
infant conditions, as well as diagnosis and treatment
for HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, and
general medical conditions. Thanks to this integrative
approach, the northern clans have largely managed
to “domesticate” the challenge of political Islam in
a manner that their southern counterparts would do
well to emulate.
Although they were a long time in coming, there
have been indications that the international community has finally begun to arrive at the same realization.
In September 2010, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs Johnnie Carson announced a “second-track strategy” that included greater engagement
with government officials from Somaliland and Puntland, with an eye to “looking for ways to strengthen
their capacity both to govern and to deliver services
to their people.”97 Likewise, the following month, after long refusing to even acknowledge their existence,
the AU’s Peace and Security Council directed thenAU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping to “broaden
consultations with Somaliland and Puntland as part
of the overall efforts to promote stability and further
peace and reconciliation in Somalia.”98
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Famine Changes the Game?
The sheer magnitude of the 2011 famine ensured
that the humanitarian crisis would have a significant
geopolitical impact. While there is blame enough to
go around, al-Shabaab was particularly culpable because of the role that its policies and actions played in
exacerbating the consequences of the disaster.
While most analysts view al-Shabaab as a far from
monolithic organization,99 its leadership had a history
of arbitrarily denying relief organizations access to
the areas under its control.100 In early 2010, several
international agencies, including the World Food Program, and NGOs pulled out of certain militant-dominant areas after several aid workers were killed and
the group began imposing strict conditions on their
remaining colleagues, extorting “security fees” and
“taxes.”101 Moreover, because al-Shabaab had been
designated as an international terrorist organization
by the United States and a number of other countries,
funding for UN operations has been restricted, while
NGOs have avoided working in areas the organization controls for fear of running afoul of laws against
providing material support to terrorist groups.102
While fears of leakage from aid are not entirely
misplaced, a far more important source of income
for al-Shabaab was, in fact, more directly related to
the drought and famines—that is, the industrial production for export of charcoal. While people living
between the Juba and Shabelle rivers in southern Somalia have gathered charcoal for their own use from
the region’s acacia forests since time immemorial, it is
only in the last few years that production has reached
its present unsustainable levels. It is estimated that
somewhere around two-thirds of the forests that used
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to cover some 15 percent of Somali territory have been
reduced to chunks of “black gold,” packed into 25-kilogram bags, and shipped to countries in the Persian
Gulf, which have themselves banned the domestic
production of charcoal.103 In the year before their export was finally embargoed by the Security Council in
2012, the UN Monitoring Group conservatively estimated that up to 4.5 million of these sacks are exported each year, primarily through the port of Kismayo,
which has been controlled by al-Shabaab or other
forces allied to its cause since September 2008, earning
the group millions of dollars in profits.104 Meanwhile,
where old-growth acacia stands once grew, thorn
bushes now proliferate, rendering the areas useless
to the Somali people, whether pastoralists or agriculturalists (the former graze their livestock in the grass
that flourishes where the root systems of acacia groves
hold in ground water and prevent erosion, while the
latter grow staple crops in neighboring lands as long
as there are tree stands holding in top soil), and contributing further to the desertification that is always
a persistent threat in a land as arid or semi-arid as
Somalia. Thus, it was both simultaneously tragic and
ironic that when a heavy rain briefly passed through
the region that was formerly the country’s breadbasket in 2013, the result was not deliverance, but disaster, as, in the absence of any foliage to help absorb the
precipitation, flash floods compounded the misery
in several places.
Al-Shabaab also operated a complex system of
taxation on residents within areas subject to its domination and imposed levies not just on aid groups, but
also on businesses, sales transactions, and land. The
tax on arable land in particular has had the effect of
changing the political economy of farming commu-
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nities that previously eked out a living just above
subsistence. For example, in Bakool and Lower Shabelle—not coincidentally, the first two areas where the
famine was declared—communities once grew their
own food and, whenever possible, stored any surplus
sorghum or maize against times of hardship. However, when al-Shabaab imposed a monetary levy on
acreage, farmers were pushed into growing cash crops
like sesame, which could be sold to traders connected
with the Islamist movement’s leadership for export in
order to obtain the funds to pay the obligatory “jihad
war contributions.”105
As if all this were not bad enough, once the famine
set in, al-Shabaab leaders alternated between denying
the crisis—arguing instead that accounts of hunger
were being “exaggerated” to undermine their hold
over the populace—and preventing affected people
from moving in search of food. Whether it is a formal policy of the group or not, al-Shabaab forces have
used force or the threat of force to prevent displaced
people from leaving its territory to find help in Lower
Shabelle106 and the Gedo and Bay regions.107
For a long time, despite the extremist ideology
espoused by its foreign-influenced leaders, which set
them outside the mainstream of Somali culture and
society, al-Shabaab could present itself as being better (albeit harsher) rulers than the corrupt denizens of
the TFG. The brutal hudud punishments its tribunals
meted out, for example, may have been utterly alien
to the Somali experience, but they represented justice
nonetheless and were a better alternative than the chaos and lawlessness that was the experience of many
Somalis in the 1990s. Moreover, the group managed to
wrap itself up in the mantle of Somali nationalism by
portraying the AU peacekeepers as foreign occupiers,
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and the fact that AMISOM troops were propping up
the despised TFG and, in the process, causing civilian casualties made this narrative all the more credible. However, as discussed previously, within the
last year, AMISOM has improved its capabilities and
managed to lower civilian casualties while pushing alShabaab forces back within Mogadishu. In addition,
the famine, and al-Shabaab’s clumsy response to it,
have damaged the movement’s already questionable
reputation for “good governance.” Not only have the
effects of famine been exacerbated by al-Shabaab, but
also the disaster exposed divisions within the movement, with some local councils and militias expressing a willingness to accept help from outside sources,
even as the central leadership continued to spurn
it.108 Furthermore, actions such as the refusal to allow
people to escape the famine will sap al-Shabaab of
what remains of its popular legitimacy. While there is
undoubtedly some risk in sending aid to areas where
al-Shabaab operates, it is likely that whatever negative
effects may result from the assistance will fall largely
on the group as some of its local leaders defect or populations are weaned from their reliance on it.109
Of course, if one is seeking to use this opportunity
to undermine al-Shabaab, the attempt would be more
likely to succeed if a prospect more attractive than
domination by the venal TFG was offered to communities just freed from the militants’ yoke. For example,
on August 6, 2011, weakened by the famine both politically and financially, al-Shabaab abruptly withdrew
from Mogadishu under cover of darkness. Although
its spokesman insisted that the pull-out was merely
for “tactical reasons” and that the group had decided
to change its strategy to “hit-and-run attacks,” the Somali capital was nonetheless left, for the first time in
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years, entirely within the potential grasp of the TFG.110
Instead of seizing the opportunity, however, the regime continued to rule as if nothing had changed.
Government troops fired on internally displaced persons lined up to receive corn rations from the World
Food Program, killing at least seven people, and then
tried to steal the food.111 Journalists subsequently
discovered that thousands of sacks of food aid meant
for famine victims were being sold at markets around
Mogadishu by local businessmen with connections to
government officials.112
AMISOM Turns the Tide, al-Shabaab Mutates.
The 2011 famine coincided with the long-awaited
progress of AMISOM. At the beginning of that year, at
not insignificant sacrifice, the AU force had managed
to extend its operational reach to 13 of Mogadishu’s
16 districts and, according to its commander, Ugandan Major General Nathan Mugisha, to “dominate”
in “more than half of these.”113 The strategic effect
was even more impressive in that it meant that about
80 percent of the city’s estimated two million people
were in areas controlled by the force. Then, during the
height of the famine in the first week of August, alShabaab announced its withdrawal from Mogadishu.
While the combined effect of the famine destroying the
militants’ hitherto lucrative “taxation” rackets and the
populace’s growing exasperation with their brutality
left al-Shabaab at its weakest point in years,114 credit is
also due to the efforts of Nathan Mugisha and his successor, Major General Fred Mugisha, in adapting their
troops to fight a counterinsurgency campaign in an
urban setting—and with limited resources at that.115
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While many of the Ugandan and Burundian soldiers who, until quite recently, made up almost all of
the AMISOM force, have experience fighting and even
counterinsurgency operations in their own countries,
these mostly took place in rural settings, not the urban
sprawl of a city like Mogadishu. Early in the mission’s
deployment, AMISOM was widely criticized for the
civilian casualties that resulted from its often hamfisted response to insurgents who fired from populated areas. Under the new doctrine, the use of indirect
fire weapons was curtailed and otherwise limited to
depopulated areas, while no-fire zones were established in the most densely populated areas. Moreover,
civil-military cooperation units were established to
investigate such incidents of civilian casualties, which
still occurred. Pre-deployment training for AMISOM
troops was also bolstered to include counterimprovised explosive device fighting in built-up areas tactics as well as improved communications and medical
instruction. Despite these improvements, AMISOM
commanders continued to lack combat aircraft and a
maritime capability—the latter a significant handicap,
given the control of the port of Kismayo by al-Shabaab.
In October 2011, the conflict dynamic in Somalia
shifted significantly with the intervention of Kenyan
military forces, ostensibly acting in response to alShabaab attacks on Kenyan territory, including the
kidnapping of several foreigners, although Kenyan
domestic political considerations also contributed
to the decision.116 Shortly after that, Ethiopian forces
entered Somalia’s Bay, Bakool, and Hiraan regions.
While the Kenyan Operation Linda Nchi (“PROTECT
THE COUNTRY”) was literally bogged down for several months, having been initiated in the middle of
the rainy season, the pressure it brought to bear on
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al-Shabaab forces in the south allowed AMISOM to renew the offensive, capturing territory on the outskirts
of Mogadishu, including the strategic “Afgooye Corridor” linking the capital with the eponymous agricultural center in the Shabelle Valley. The Kenyan troops
formally joined AMISOM in July 2012, although the
extent to which they are actually under the operational
command and control of the AU forces commanders is
uncertain. Three months later, the Kenyans and their
Somali militia allies—themselves officially rebranded
as Somali government forces—succeeded in forcing
al-Shabaab to withdraw from Kismayo.117
By early 2012, as al-Shabaab faced attacks on three
separate fronts by AMISOM, Kenyan, and Ethiopian
forces, a divide emerged between the militant leadership.118 On the one side was a “nationalist” faction
consisting of clan-based militia leaders who were
mainly determined to oust the TFG and expand the
power of their own clans, while on the other was a
smaller group of hardliners who, with their foreign
supporters, emphasized a transnational jihadist
agenda. In February 2012, the latter faction formally
affiliated with al-Qaeda. While the merger did little
to forestall the loss of Kismayo and the collapse of alShabaab’s control of wide swaths of southern and central Somalia, under their new branding, the hardline
militants have refocused their efforts on sustaining a
protracted asymmetric fight involving hit-and-run attacks on AMISOM and Somali government positions,
the planting of improvised explosive devices, assassinations of government officials, terrorist (including
suicide) bombings, and the execution of suspected
spies. While such attacks may not be able to shift the
tide of the war in al-Shabaab’s favor, they “are ca-
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pable of disrupting enemy forces and preventing the
transition to a more stable security and political
environment.”119
Another Somali Government.
The TFG’s repeatedly-extended mandate expired
on August 20, 2012, by which time the regime was so
discredited that its international backers were unwilling to see it continue any longer. Consequently, following the London Conference on Somalia hosted by
British Prime Minister David Cameron in February,
the TFG set into motion a complicated process whereby a group of elders representing the clans and subclans, which all now acknowledged remained the permanent framework of Somali society, were supposed
to pick a broadly representative constituent assembly.
The constituent assembly, in turn, was supposed to
prepare a permanent constitution and give way to a
parliament, which would elect the president.
Unfortunately, the process was vitiated from the
start, with more than half of the supposed “elders”
not being elders at all. The vetting process, which was
supposed to weed out puppets of the TFG officials
and other imposters—as well as those with a history
of violence or lacking basic literacy—was predicated
on political rivals serving as a check on each other.
Instead, TFG President Sharif Ahmed, Prime Minister
Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, and Parliamentary Speaker
Sharif Hassan Sheikh Hassan put aside their difference
and colluded to pack the elders and, consequently, the
constituent assembly.120 Subsequently, it was widely
reported that seats in the new 275-member parliament
were put on sale for as much as $25,000.121

48

When the new legislature met on September 11,
2012, under AMISOM’s protection at the Mogadishu
airport to elect a president, the widely-discredited
incumbent, Sharif Ahmed, actually won the largest
number of votes from the parliamentarians in the first
round and fell just shy of the majority needed for another term in office. In fact, what may have caused his
loss of the next round of balloting was his own greed:
he was reportedly given $7 million dollars from Gulf
sources to buy his reelection and yet, until the desperate second round of the vote, he doled out stingy
payments in the $10,000 range to the electors, many
of whom, when they learned the sum he had at his
disposal, turned on him.122 Instead, they elected a civil
society activist and educator with close ties to the
moderate Islamist movement al-Islah (“Reform”), Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, to head the “Federal Republic
of Somalia” (FRS), the failed state’s 16th transitional
entity since 1991, with a 4-year mandate.
A Lesson about Legitimacy and the
Limits of Military Force in Counterinsurgency.
The failure of successive Somali regimes to prevail
over their opponents and bring an end to the 2-decadeold conflict has little to do with the complaints often
voiced about lack of outside assistance, especially of
the military kind, than other factors over which external actors can have little positive effect. Specifically, if
the regime fighting an insurgency is unable or unwilling to achieve internal political legitimacy, no outside
intervention will be able to help it to “victory,” as even
a cursory review of the relationship between legitimacy and military force in civil wars will confirm.
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It is a principle that, in civil wars, while military
force is vital for insurgents—without it, they pose no
threat to the state—it is less important to the governments that oppose them. For the latter, while having capable armed forces and the political will to use
them is not unimportant, unless the governments
achieve legitimacy, their counterinsurgency operations will ultimately fail. As for the sustainability of
any peace, it depends less on a government’s military
strength than on its ability to convince the population
of its legitimacy, deriving just powers from those it
proposes to govern and providing them with reasonable opportunities for political, economic, and social
development.123
At a very simplified level, there are three types of
parties in any civil conflict: the core group that supports any given faction, whether high-minded principle or mere material interest; those who support
the opposing faction; and those, often in the majority,
who are disinterested in or indifferent to the competing claims of the rival factions.124 The factions contend
with each other to convince the disinterested populace
of their legitimacy, which has been defined as:
the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands, so that those commands are
obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed in some way to have moral
authority, because subjects believe that they ought
to obey.125

The classic distinction by Max Weber listed three
grounds legitimating any rule: traditional legitimacy
(“the authority of the eternal past”), juridical right
(“rule by virtue of legality”), and charisma (“the authority of the exception”).126 For a government, the
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provision of goods and services to the population offers another form of legitimacy, or is at least often the
first step to creating a system in which its legitimacy
is accepted. Conversely, the failure to meet basic expectations weakens the same claim of legitimacy. For
its part, insurgents can use terror to underscore an incumbent regime’s inability to protect its own population, thus delegitimizing it. More positively, rebels can
garner support and legitimacy from the populace by
providing it with the very political and social goods
that the government has proven unable or unwilling
to supply.
In this context, especially for governments, military
power has its limits. While military action can remedy
some of the symptoms of diminished legitimacy, force
alone cannot restore it. It needs to be recalled that the
very existence of an insurgency implies a base of support that, if it does not actively aid the insurgents, at
least tolerates them and, in so doing, implicitly denies
the government’s claim to legitimacy. Consequently,
the military components of a counterinsurgency must
be carefully calibrated to avoid adding to the numbers
of the disaffected and “all actions, kinetic or nonkinetic, must be planned and executed with consideration of their contribution toward strengthening [the
government’s] legitimacy.”127
The effect of external interventions, whether to assist governments in defeating insurgents or to merely
hasten the end of conflicts, also needs to be carefully
weighed since they may actually exacerbate a regime’s crisis of legitimacy by drawing attention to its
weakness and even making it seem to be but a pawn
of the intervening force. Just winning, in purely military terms, “may not be enough and, often, may be
a mistake or deflect one from grasping the prize of
legitimacy itself.”128
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There is little that a foreign actor can do to buttress
an allied regime’s domestic legitimacy unless the latter
is truly committed to taking the necessary measures
to maintain—if not enhance—political, economic, and
social development not only for its core supporters,
but the disinterested portion of the population as well.
If, on the other hand, the government under challenge
manages to maintain its legitimacy with these two
groups, the rebels will be reduced to struggling just
to survive. All of this, of course, requires the commitment of considerable amounts of time and resources.
As Henry Kissinger succinctly framed it, while “the
guerrilla wins if he does not lose,” the regime he
opposes “loses if it does not win.”129
Conclusion.
The 2-decades-old crisis in Somalia may have at
its origin the collapse of a “failed state,” but blame
for the prolongation of its misery could be more accurately attributed to a wholesale failure of imagination on the part of the international community and
the local actors beholden to it. First, these parties have
focused almost exclusively on southern and central
Somalia, continually repeating the mistakes of their
successive “top-down” attempts at state-building,
while obstinately refusing to even acknowledge the
largely positive experiences that have unfolded in
other parts of the country.130 Second, their approach
has been almost entirely centered upon the state,
while ignoring traditional clan and religious leaders,
members of the vibrant Somali business community,
and civil society actors—the very people whose efforts have prevented statelessness from degenerating into complete anarchy and disorder. Third, when
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they do deign to intervene through proxies like the
brave but, for the longest time, undermanned and
poorly resourced Ugandan and Burundian troops deployed in “peacekeeping” where there was no peace,
they expend these scarce resources in the vain attempt
to prop up an unpopular regime whose legitimacy, in
the eyes of many Somalis, is dubious at best. Rather,
they should husband scarce resources to contain the
spread of instability and prevent additional foreign
fighters and supplies from further fueling the conflict.
The creation of the “second edition” of the TFG
at the beginning of 2009 was an exercise in political
management that was primarily designed to impose
a certain preconceived notion. Since an Islamist insurgency was perceived to be the chief challenge, a
supposed “moderate” Islamist was installed at the
head of the TFG through the extralegal machinations
of a group of ersatz parliamentarians designated for
that purpose by the representative of the UN Secretary General, doubling the size of the already bloated
legislature. As it turns out, Sharif Ahmed’s sponsors
failed to take into account the clan dynamics and
soon learned that the new president would have
trouble even rallying his own Abgaal kinsmen. By
the end of his first year in office, the TFG president
controlled even less of Mogadishu than his highly
unpopular predecessor, despite the presence of an
AMISOM force that was repeatedly reinforced. As he
begins what is supposed to be his final year in office,
even supporters of the Djibouti Process have publicly cast “an acceptable alternative” to the TFG.131 In
this regard, it would have been helpful if someone
had recalled the insight of I. M. Lewis:
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If further progress is to be achieved in state-formation, Somali politicians will surely have to come out
of “denial” and start seriously exploring how clan
and lineage ties can be utilized positively. Perhaps
they could learn from their nomadic kinsmen who
unashamedly celebrate these traditional institutions.
Here a less Eurocentric and less evolutionary view of
lineage institutions by Western commentators, social scientists, and bureaucrats might help to create
a more productive environment for rethinking clanship (i.e., agnation) positively.132

Since that advice has not been taken, the international community is left with the inescapable
conclusion drawn from the evidence exhaustively
assembled by the Monitoring Group that about the
only thing the TFG did well was to engage in criminal activity ranging from simple theft of resources
to complex visa fraud schemes. While in its first few
months in power, the FRS, headed by Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud, has shown itself to be considerably less encumbered than its predecessor by allegations of corruption. However, its writ still barely extends beyond
the municipal boundaries of Mogadishu, and its efforts to lift the embargo on the export of charcoal from
Somalia have raised concerns.133
A more viable course than the one hitherto adopted by the international community would be one that
adapts to the decentralized nature of Somali society
and privileges the bottom-up approach. The new
course should be better suited to buy Somalis the
time and space needed to make their own determinations about their future political arrangements,
while also being flexible enough to allow their neighbors and the rest of the international community the
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ability to protect their legitimate security interests.
Supporting governance at the level where it is accountable and legitimate—whether in the context
of nascent states like Somaliland and Puntland in the
northern regions or in local communities and civil
society structures in parts of the south—is the most
effective and efficient means of both managing the
societal fault lines and countering the security threats
that have arisen in the wake of the collapse of the
Somali state.
The repeated failure of internationally-backed
attempts to reestablish a national government in Somalia underscores the profound error of privileging
top-down, state-centric processes that are structurally engineered with a bias in favor of centralization, rather than bottom-up, community-based approaches better adapted to the clan sensibilities of
the Somali and viewed by them as legitimate. As one
analyst has summarized it:
The UN, Western governments, and donors have
tried repeatedly to build a strong central government—the kind of entity that they are most comfortable dealing with—in defiance of local sociopolitical
dynamics and regional history.134

This has occurred despite the fact that the contemporary experience of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan—confirmed by the
different outcomes in southern and central Somalia
and in Somaliland and Puntland—clearly suggests
that bottom-up efforts, especially when they reinforce the connection between legitimate local nonstate structures and state institutions, have a greater
chance of success. They are more likely to be viewed
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as legitimate by the populations most directly impacted. The fact is, as one scholar has noted:
At the dawn of the 21st century, the Somali clans do
not appear at all to occupy a place all that fundamentally different from that which they had at the
time of colonization.135

The stubborn refusal to acknowledge this reality
results in the repeated capture of otherwise wellintended efforts by the very spoilers whose lack of
legitimacy, originating in their lack of connection
to the deep roots of a society’s identity, provoked
the crisis in the first place. The real tragedy is that
the failure to learn this lesson has, in recent years,
not only wasted billions of dollars and the lives of
hundreds of peacekeepers, but also prolonged the immense human suffering and permitted what is now an
al-Qaeda affiliate to entrench itself in one of the most
vulnerable corners of the globe. It would be an even
greater tragedy if not absorbing this real lesson from
Somalia meant that the same error is to be repeated
elsewhere in Africa and beyond.
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